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far silent but ambitious proletariat. The lower strata of society were no longer looking for sympathy. They wanted power, and if properly led would break down all barriers to its attainment. The voice of the grumbling dispossessed first sounded clearly in Russian literature through Maxim Gorki's early stories, which began to appear in 1892. The best example of the young intellectual who discovered saving graces in Marxism was Lenin. He began to study Marx's *Capital* in 1888, organized a group of Marxists at Kuibyshev (Samara) in 1893, and was a social-democratic propagandist in St. Petersburg the next year. The emergence of Marxism as an active political and economic system in Russia dates from this period.

The rise of the Social Democratic party and the foundation of the more activist section known as the Bolsheviki (the maximalists) headed by Lenin himself preceded the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war by barely one year. At the same time, another radical party, the Social Revolutionaries, revived the tradition of terrorism as practiced before the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. The government pursued a policy of repression even when the necessity of prosecuting a war for which the nation was totally unprepared might well have dictated a more conciliatory attitude. Profound resentment now mastered not only the middle class but the urban proletariat, and though the police resorted to desperate provocatory acts in order to discredit the agitators, a united front against the government was rapidly forming. When open revolution broke out early in 1905, neither the middle-class liberals nor the radical Marxist groups possessed an organization equal to organizing and directing a mass movement. As a result, after the government made various constitutional concessions and the extremists showed every sign of fighting to a finish, the moderate groups gravitated away from the revolutionary idea, leaving the Marxist leaders and the workers isolated. With the urban middle class again passive, the government speedily recovered its sangfroid and applied repressive measures of forbidding severity which were far from supplying any basis for

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186* 648 Prague and Belgrade should be of the same quality as those existing between Warsaw and Bucharest, or between Belgrade and Warsaw—which no one can claim to be the case. Rather, it is precisely regarding the manner of averting the Teutonic peril that Czechs and Yugoslavs have held views which, if not conflicting, were at least divergent: in Prague they feared a restoration of the Habsburgs more than the *Anschluss*, while the reverse was the case in Belgrade.

To the credit side of the relations between Belgrade and Prague must be put the action, both sentimental and positive, of the Slovene statesmen and propagandists, many of whom, [665] moreover, had studied in Bohemia. Immediately after the First World War, Abbé Korochetz' Popular Party (Catholic), which had come under the influence of the Czech Popular Party (*Lidova Strana*), was the one which, in its organ, the *Slovenets*, dealt most fully with questions relating to the Serbo-Bulgarian reconciliation and with Soviet Russia. The Czech Government was for a time tempted to intervene as mediator in the dispute between Belgrade and Sofia. It wisely abstained; the Serbs would certainly have been offended. At least its press always treated this dispute with tact and discretion.

Summing-up, let us say that, between the two wars, the atmosphere of the Czech-Yugoslav relations was one of the positive factors in the spirit of Slav solidarity.

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If the Russo-Polish relations (and, in a certain measure, the Polish-Czech) are the touchstone of this solidarity in Central Europe, in the South-East it is through the Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations that crises are manifested. We have defined the place that Bulgaria, a Slavicised rather than a Slav people,[12] holds in the ethnical community, and the alternations of Russophilia and Russophobia through which she has passed. In 1915 she 563

[12] It will be remembered, however, that in 1933, when MM. Gömbös and Kanya, respectively Hungarian Chairman of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, returned from Sofia (where Gömbös had conferred, in the Serbo-Croat language, with Mouchanov, the Bulgarian President), they declared to the Hungarian newspapers that they had 'visited Bulgaria, a country related to them by blood'. The Bulgarian press was unanimous in protesting against this expression; Bulgars and Magyars can be friends, but not relatives. The argument of ethnical relationship (Finnish) had nevertheless been put forward by certain Bulgarian propagandists in 1916–1917; it was the time when the poet Cyrille Kristov called himself a 'Tartaro-Bulgar'.

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186* 648 829 those of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—although the two latter had not yet recognised the Soviets. The new undertakings marked an advance on the part of Soviet Russia towards a policy of interest, if not of action, in Europe. Western opinion, then entirely occupied with the Economic Conference, gave the matter only casual attention; it did no more than manifest its satisfaction at seeing the question of Bessarabia disappear from the list of outstanding disputes. But the importance of the event lay elsewhere; it represented nothing less than an attempt to regroup forces in Eastern Europe. The territorial statute arising out of the treaties was consolidated by the backing of a power, the U.S.S.R., which hitherto had not been thought to be very favourable to it. Henceforth the Slavs of Central and Southern Europe felt morally obliged to consider recognising the Soviets. The defensive reflexes of the Slavonic instinct came into play. [665] At the seventeenth Assembly of the Communist Party, in January, 1934—the first to take place after the offensive on the part of Russian diplomacy in Europe—Stalin declared: 'Some people think that war must be prepared by the *superior race, i.e.*, the Germanic race, against the *inferior races,* and, especially, against the Slavs . . .'. This language aroused a world of memories, and an ideology which was believed to have lapsed. It was understood far beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R.

There was, however, one obstacle which prevented the Slavonic peoples from seeing in it more than a diplomatic gesture. They had hitherto looked to France for security guarantees. In Prague, as in Belgrade, they were anxious, at all costs, to prevent the development of a situation which might put the country under the obligation of choosing between Paris and Moscow. This was the constant, though unacknowledged, preoccupation of all the Little Entente Conferences. The policy of Louis Barthou, which prepared the way for a Franco-Sovietic *rapprochement,* did away with this possibility, and so the Czech Government recognised the Soviets on June 9, 1934. That summer of 1934 was a period of intense diplomatic activity for the Slavonic nations. In Bulgaria, on May 19, a *coup d'état* carried to power Kimon Gheorgiev with his National Union Cabinet. The first item on his programme was the *entente* with the Yugoslavs, the second the resumption of relations with the Soviets. It was on July 23 that the recognition was made official; it was the work

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pursued on parallel lines, in Slav and non-Slav countries alike.

On the instigation of Moscow, these countries entered into treaties of friendship and mutual assistance. These were so worded as to give the impression, at first, of being designed to wipe out long-standing heritages of hatred or distrust between peoples hitherto antagonistic to one another. Passed for a period of twenty years, and all on the same lines, these treaties were signed on the following dates:—

November 27, 1947: between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
December 8: between Hungary and Yugoslavia.
December 16: between Bulgaria and Albania.
December 19: between Yugoslavia and Rumania.
January 16, 1948: between Bulgaria and Rumania.
January 24: between Hungary and Rumania.
February 4: between the Soviet Union and Rumania.
March 18: between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.
April 23: between Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

The commentaries which accompanied the signing of these agreements spoke, with ever-growing emphasis, of the 'peril' to the peace of Europe involved in the attitude of the Western powers. Centred at first on the German menace, they subsequently referred to fresh risks, clearly indicated. Thus the Soviet radio declared that the pact between Bulgaria and Moscow acquired significance from the fact that 'certain Western powers have, under the patronage of the United States, taken the creation of military blocs as the basis of their policy'.

Even the idea of a 'Balkan Federation', which in 1944 had found partisans in Moscow, was gradually pushed into the background, for fear that the essential core of this federation, the Bulgarian-Yugoslav bloc, might create a Slav community, which should one day grow strong enough to adopt an attitude of independence in regard to the Soviet Union. So, although it was originally inspired by Russia, this project for a union was later to be denounced by the Kremlin as a ruse of 'Western imperialism', and Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Premier, was to be disavowed by Moscow, in January, 1948, for having made an untimely allusion to it.

* * *

The standardisation of Soviet policy in Europe was to take its definite shape in the conference held in Warsaw in September,

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1947, by the delegates of the Communist Parties of nine European nations. It was then decided to set up a 'Joint Information Bureau' (*Kominform*), whose function would be to ensure organic liaison between these different parties, with a view to co-ordinating their activities and pooling their experience. A communiqué was broadcast on October 9 by the delegate of the Russian Communist Party, Idanov, a member of the Soviet Politburo. He contrasted the 'war-mongering' of the Western States with the 'pacifism' of the 'popular democracies' placed under the influence of the Soviet Union. He affirmed the mission of the Communist Parties to combat 'attempts at enslavement', the most dangerous form of which was, in Moscow's view, the Marshall Plan.

The seat of the new organisation, which was to publish a bi-mensual organ, was fixed in Belgrade. Its activities, in conformity with policy dictated by the Kremlin, aggravated the crisis in relations between East and West, and opened the period of tension to which the name of 'cold war' has been applied.

The Kominform is not a resurrection of the Komintern, dissolved in 1943. It is based, indeed, on the idea that the 'national' Communist Parties have reached a state of maturity and power which enables them to be henceforth regarded as autonomous on the plane of the common struggle against capitalist régimes.

The signatories to the Kominform's declaration were: Idanov and Malenkov (U.S.S.R.), Kardelj and Djilas (Yugoslavia), Tchervenkov and Poptomov (Bulgaria), Gheorghiu Dej and Anna Pauker (Rumania), Farkas and Revai (Hungary), Gomulka (Poland), Duclos and Fajon (France), Slanski and Bastovanski (Czechoslovakia), Longo and Reale (Italy).

The Kominform, controlled from Moscow, was rapidly to exert its activities in a domain which its promoters had not foreseen.

Indeed, Slav solidarity, already overtaken and superseded by the watchword of Marxist unity, was to suffer a still more serious set-back from the rupture between Tito and Moscow. It was in Belgrade that the Kominform had set up its seat; from Belgrade came the blow which was to shake its authority, and the dogma of Muscovite infallibility, in the whole of Eastern Europe.

1 [Delegate of Russian Communist Party, Idanov -- Analyst]

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In a motion published on June 28, 1948, the Kominform, which met in Bucharest from June 16–24, approved the sensational resolution of the U.S.S.R. Communist Party, denouncing the policy of the Yugoslav Communists and the errors of Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovitch, 'who have embarked on a road leading to treachery towards the international solidarity of the working classes'.

Thereupon began the struggle between Moscow and Belgrade, which was to grow more acute as the months went by. And the organisation of the offensive against Tito and the progress of 'Titoism'—in other words, 'national Marxism'—in the popular democracies, headed the agenda of all the meetings of the Kominform, especially the one held in Hungary in November, 1949, when a resolution passed at the conference invited even the Yugoslav Communist Party to get rid of the 'spies' and the 'assassins' who were governing the country.

One of the consequences of the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture has been the revival of the old Bulgaro-Serbian quarrel over Macedonia: the Balkans are again being plunged into hatred and irredentism, as we saw them at the end of the nineteenth century, during the Balkan Wars, and in the First World War.

Such were the events which, between 1946 and 1948, transformed the general physiognomy of the Slavonic world. A rapid review of the internal policies of the different countries concerned will show how they evolved.

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Until 1947 the Belgrade Government's policy remained based on complete solidarity with the Soviet Union. The agreements reached on June 10, 1946, during the Stalin-Tito interview, formed the basis for the commercial agreements of July 25, 1947.

The starting-point of the rupture between Stalin and Tito is to be found in an exchange of letters (in March, 1948), between the (Russian) Bolchevik Party and the Yugoslav Communist Party, regarding the conduct of Soviet officers in Yugoslavia.

But that was only a pretext. In reality, the Soviets could not forgive Tito for being the only head of an Eastern European Government to pride himself on having been an armed leader

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in the fight for liberation, at a time when Russia could not intervene. His dictatorial attitude, his personal prestige, aroused distrust on the part of the Kremlin. On the Yugoslav side, they were shocked by the conceit of the Russians, who lavished instructions and counsel on a nation which considered its own political experience superior to that of the Russians, and who, in the course of history, had won and rewon its independence entirely by its own efforts. Serbian pride, wounded by the demands made by Moscow, precipitated the rupture.

On the other hand, Yugoslavia is peopled by an emancipated peasantry; it has made its own agrarian reforms, and has not had to suffer the yoke of political dynasties (as has been the case with Rumania), nor (like Hungary) that of a landed aristocracy. Communism could not get a footing there, either in the same form or at the same speed, as in the other 'popular democracies'.

Finally, the systematic enslaving of the economy of Yugoslavia to Russian interests was bound, one way or another, to provoke violent reaction in Belgrade.

It was nevertheless a surprise for the world when, on June 28, 1948, the Kominform communiqué pronounced the condemnation of Tito and his collaborators, accused of desiring to establish themselves by a régime of terror, of over-estimating the possibility for their country of safeguarding its independence without the assistance of the other Communist Parties; finally, of seeking the support of the capitalist States.

Dr. Pijade, the theoretician of Tito's régime, felt able to reveal[1] that the Kominform's resolution simply reproduced a text prepared in Moscow: he stated that the hands of waverers had been forced by a lying assurance that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party contained spies on behalf of England and the United States.

Then began a diplomatic battle between Moscow and Belgrade: at first it took the form of a criss-cross exchange of notes, then that of an economic boycott and, finally, of a vast scheme to detach Yugoslavia from the other popular democracies and reduce her to isolation.

The diplomatic notes at first (July-August, 1948) dealt with the fate of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia; then (August-

[1] Speech made on July 8, 1949, at Novi Sad.

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September) the role played by the Soviet Union in international conferences regarding Yugoslav claims to Southern Carinthia. In one of these notes (August 11) Moscow accused the Belgrade Government of acting 'not as an ally, but as an enemy of the Soviet Union'.

'We can establish Socialism without the U.S.S.R.', Tito had declared.

For a few months the Belgrade press attacked the Kominform, without going so far as to mention its real promoters. On May 30, 1949, for the first time, *Borba,* the organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, openly attacked the Soviet Union, which it accused of seeking to foment the Yugoslav people against the Government. And Pijade denounced 'Russian nationalism', cloaked under the mantle of Marxist orthodoxy, 'which does not allow any other Communist Party to consider itself the equal of the Bolchevik Party, or any other State to raise itself above the level fixed for it by Moscow'. He accused the Soviet Union of recruiting traitors to form a 'pro-Stalin, anti-Tito front' in Yugoslavia.

The friendship and mutual assistance pacts concluded by the other popular democracies with the Belgrade Government were denounced during the same week: on September 28, 1949, the Kremlin gave the signal for these notices of termination. On October 1 Bulgaria annulled the pact of November 27, 1947, and was followed by Rumania in respect of the pact of December 19, 1947, and by Czechoslovakia (on October 4) in respect of the treaty of friendship of May 9, 1946, and the cultural agreement of April 27, 1947. The Warsaw Government had anticipated matters by declaring, as far back as September 8, 1949, that Tito's Government had 'trampled on and destroyed' the Polish-Yugoslav pact of March 18, 1946.

The heads of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Moscow, and of the Soviet mission in Belgrade, were recalled during the autumn of 1949, and the majority of their collaborators declared 'undesirable', on charges of espionage or sabotage. The cases brought, in Hungary and Bulgaria respectively, against Rajk, ex-minister (September) and Kostov, ex-Vice-President of the Council (December)—cases involving Yugoslavs—were so arranged as to bolster up the Soviet accusations against Tito and his role in the Balkans.